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Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedural Survey – 2017 Supplement 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2018 Supplement to the Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedure Survey (the 
“Supplement”) was compiled by staff members and the Note and Comment Editors of the Kansas 
Law Review.  The 2018 Supplement is intended to provide a snapshot of the changes in criminal 
procedure law in 2017.   This Supplement should be read in conjunction with the 2016 Criminal 
Procedure Survey, which provides a more detailed review of each area of the law, and the 2017 
Supplement.1  The 2018 Supplement highlights changes in Kansas criminal procedure law using 
cases from the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas Court of Appeals, along with relevant 
decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. This 
Supplement provides full citations to both state and regional case reporters when applicable. 
Substantial changes in Kansas statutes are also summarized.  Our goal is that the Supplement will 
serve as a resource to inform practitioners and judges on the development of Kansas criminal 
procedure law and its current status.  
II. SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
United States v. Zuniga-Leija, No. 16-CR-20109-JAR, 
2017 WL 3215678 (D. Kan. July 28, 2017) 
Full Case Citation: United States v. Zuniga-Leija, No. 16-CR-20109-JAR, 2017 WL 3215678 
(D. Kan. July 28, 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: II.C.1. – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search 
Warrant Requirement / Consent 
 
Summary: 
The Kansas District Court distinguished United States v. Zuniga-Leija2 from the Tenth 
Circuit decision in United States v. Jones,3 and provides a detailed analysis for determining what 
constitutes non-verbal consent to a search.4  In Jones, the Tenth Circuit held that an adult 
defendant—following a police search request—walking to the back door of his house without 
objecting to police following him counted as non-verbal consent to search the residence.5 
                                                   
1  U. Kan. L. Rev., Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedure Survey 2016, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. (2016), 
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.drupal.ku.edu/files/docs/law_review/v64/2016%20Crim%20Pro%20Survey.pdf; U. 
Kan. L. Rev., Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedure Survey Supplement 2017, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. (2017), 
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.drupal.ku.edu/files/docs/law_review/v65/Kansas%20Law%20Review%20Criminal%20
Procedural%20Survey%20%C2%AD%202017%20Supplement.pdf.   
2  No. 16-CR-20109-JAR, 2017 WL 3215678, at *6 (D. Kan. July 28, 2017). 
3  701 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2012). 
4  Zuniga-Leija, 2017 WL 3215678, at *6. 
5  Id. (citing 701 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2012)).  
 2 
In Zuniga-Leija, the court held there were several factual differences that necessitated a 
different outcome.6  Here, evidence was unclear as to how (or even if) the officers requested to 
search the home and whether the officers were given permission to enter the home when a 17-
year-old girl turned away from to door to get her ailing mother.7  The district court held that 
there were too many ambiguities in the facts for the officers’ actions to survive the objective 
reasonable officer standard for determining if consent had been given.8  In dicta, the court raised 
other concerns about the girl and her mother’s abilities to give consent to a search.9 
State v. Howard, 389 P.3d 1280 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Howard, 305 Kan. 984, 389 P.3d 1280 (2017). 
 
2016 Sections: II.C.3. – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search Warrant 
Requirement / Automobiles and Vehicles 
 
Summary: 
 Defendant Howard appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of a search on 
the grounds that a reclined seat, a plastic baggie with a corner ripped out, and the police officer’s 
experience did not constitute probable cause.10  A police officer pulled Howard over for entering 
a gas station to avoid a traffic light.11  Once the vehicles were stopped, the officer noticed that, in 
the time since he first saw the car, the passenger had reclined her seat.12  After taking the 
defendant’s identification, the officer learned that there was a warrant out for his arrest.13  The 
officer had the defendant step out of the car, “scanned” the car for a weapon, and found “a plastic 
baggie with a ripped out corner.”14  The officer then arrested defendant and placed him in the 
back of his patrol car.15  Next, the officer took the passenger’s identification, learned she had a 
warrant out for her arrest, and had her step out of the car.16  The officer required her to remain on 
a curb 6 to 8 feet away.17  He then moved her seat and found a firearm.18  
 At issue on appeal was whether the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle.19  
The state argued that the officer had probable cause to believe there was contraband or evidence 
of a crime in the car because of the reclined seat, the clear plastic baggie, and the officer’s 
                                                   
6  Id. 
7  Id.  
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 7–9.  
10  State v. Howard, 305 Kan. 984, 987, 389 P.3d 1280,1284 (2017). 
11  Id. at 986, 389 P.3d at 1283. 
12  Id.  
13  Id.  
14  Id.  
15  Id.  
16  Id.  
17  Id.  
18  Id. 
19  Id. at 989, 389 P.3d at 1285. 
 3 
knowledge that “twisted off corners of clear plastic baggies” are used to package drugs.20  The 
Kansas Supreme Court found all of these facts persuasive.21  First, the court “conclude[d] that it 
was fair for the officer in this case to infer from the passenger's action of reclining her seat that 
she was trying to hide something from his view.”22 Second, the court held that the baggie and the 
officer’s knowledge of the use of baggies “helped to establish probable cause.”23  Therefore, the 
court held that the officer had sufficient facts to establish probable cause and affirmed the denial 
of defendant’s motion to suppress.24   
State v. Bannon, 398 P.3d 846 (2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Bannon, 306 Kan. 886, 398 P.3d 846 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: II.C.4.a – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search 
Warrant Requirement / Exceptions to the Search Warrant / Terry Stops  
 
Summary: 
 Defendant Bannon appealed his conviction for the criminal carrying of a firearm in an 
apartment on the Wichita State University campus.25  Bannon argued the district court erred 
when it failed to suppress the evidence of Bannon carrying a weapon on campus.26  The State 
claimed the search of Bannon’s person was lawful under the Terry stop doctrine and K.S.A. 22-
2402, which codified the requirements of a Terry stop.27  The Kansas Supreme Court held that 
regardless of the wording related to officer safety contained in the statute, “the ultimate 
constitutionality of such a seizure is still measured against the requirements of Terry and the 
Fourth Amendment.”28  Additionally, the court emphasized that the focus of Terry’s second 
prong remains on “whether the person stopped is armed and presently dangerous.”29   
 Courts across the country are split on whether “a reasonable suspicion that the person is 
armed and presently dangerous” is a subjective or objective requirement.30  The Kansas Supreme 
Court adopted the Utah Supreme Court’s hybrid approach.31  An officer’s subjective belief or 
fear of a suspect being “armed and presently dangerous” is only “one factor in the totality of 
circumstances examined in an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”32  A police 
                                                   
20  Id. at 990, 389 P.3d at 1286. 
21  Id. at 991-94, 389 P.3d at 1286-88. 
22  Id. at 991, 389 P.3d at 1286. 
23  Id. at 993-94, 389 P.3d at 1287-88. 
24  Id. at 994, 389 P.3d at 1288. 
25 State v. Bannon, 306 Kan. 886, 886, 398 P.3d 846, 847 (2017). 
26 Id. at 886, 398 P.3d at 847. 
27 Id. at 892, 398 P.3d at 848, 851. 
28 Id. at 892–93, 398 P.3d at 851. 
29 Id. at 893, 398 P.3d at 851. 
30 Id. at 894, 398 P.3d at 852. 
31 Id. at 896, 398 P.3d at 853; see State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003). 
32 Bannon, 306 Kan. at 896, 398 P.3d at 853. 
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officer’s subjective belief is insufficient by itself, but courts cannot “completely disregard” the 
officer’s belief.33  The Kansas Supreme Court remanded the case because the Court of Appeals 
failed to correctly apply the Terry test.34 
State v. Carr, 406 P.3d 403 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Carr, 54 Kan. App. 2d 780, 406 P.3d 403 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: II.C.4.a – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search 
Warrant Requirement / Other Circumstances in Which Limited Searches are Allowed Without a 
Warrant or Probable Cause / Terry Stops  
 
Summary:  
 Defendant appealed his convictions for marijuana possession and aggravated battery, 
claiming error in the denial of his motion to suppress fruits of an illegal Terry stop.35  Defendant 
was a passenger in a vehicle at the time of the stop.36  The officers testified that they stopped the 
vehicle because they believed it might be associated with the defendant, who was a suspect in a 
drive-by shooting they were investigating.37  The officers’ believed that the vehicle was 
associated with defendant because one of Defendant’s relatives owned the same type of car and 
the officers had seen the car at the defendant’s house.38  There was no traffic violation to support 
the stop.39  
 The “central question” for the court on appeal was “whether a wanted person’s 
‘association’ with a car alone gives an officer reasonable suspicion to stop that car without other 
facts or information that suggest the wanted person is in the car on that particular day.”40  
Because the officers stopped the vehicle solely because the defendant’s relative owned the same 
type of vehicle and the officers had seen the vehicle at the defendant’s house, the court 
determined that the officers acted on a hunch, rather than reasonable suspicion.41  They did not 
have specific, articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion that Defendant was in the vehicle 
and therefore the stop was illegal.42  Therefore the court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to 
suppress.43  
 
                                                   
33 Warren, 78 P.3d at 596. 
34 Id. at 989, 398 P.3d at 854. 
35  State v. Carr, 54 Kan. App. 2d 780, 782, 406 P.3d 403, 407 (2017) 
36  
37  Id. at 409, 54 Kan. App. 2d at 787. 
38  Id.. 
39  Id.  
40  Id. at 410, 54 Kan. App. 2d at 788. 
41  Id. at 412, 54 Kan. App. 2d at 791-92. 
42  Id. at 412, 54 Kan. App. 2d at 792. 
43  Id. at 414, 54 Kan. App. 2d at 795. 
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United States v. Nelson, 868 F.3d 885 (10th Cir. 2017) 
Full Case Citations: United States v. Nelson, 868 F.3d 885 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: II.C.4.c – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search 
Warrant Requirement / Other Circumstances in Which Limited Searches are Allowed Without a 
Warrant or Probable Cause / Protective Sweeps of Premises  
 
Summary: 
 Nelson challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the guns police 
found when performing a protective sweep his house following Nelson’s arrest.44  The police 
arrested Nelson at a residence with four levels.45  The police entered on the third level and 
escorted Nelson’s girlfriend to the second level, before seeing Nelson on the first level.46  The 
officers called Nelson to the second floor for arrest.47  After arresting Nelson, one officer 
searched the first level where Nelson was hiding, eventually finding illegal weapons.48  Nelson 
argued the search of the house violated the Fourth Amendment.49  The United States argued the 
search was covered under the protective-sweep doctrine.50   
 The Tenth Circuit held the protective-sweep doctrine requires a reasonable inference that 
someone else was in the house.51  The government cannot rely on the fact that the police had “no 
way of knowing if anyone else was in the residence.”52  The court held if police possessed no 
knowledge about the “potential presence of a third person,” the government failed to satisfy the 
protective-sweep doctrine’s requirements.53  The Tenth Circuit provided examples based on its 
precedent that might lead to the inference of the presence of another person: specific information 
another person lived in the home, watching another person enter the house, and the arrestee 
telling the officers that other people were in the house.54  Additionally, police must learn this 
information before the protective sweep occurs.55  The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court to determine whether the police’s knowledge was enough to justify the sweep of the 
first floor.56 
 
                                                   
44  United States v. Nelson, 868 F.3d 885, 887 (10th Cir. 2017).  
45  Id. at 888. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 889. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 890; see e.g., United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v.Hauk, 412 
F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cavely, 318 F.3d 987, 994 (10th Cir. 2003). 
55  Id. at 890. 
56  Id. 
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State v. Ryce, 396 P.3d 711 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation:  State v. Ryce, 306 Kan. 682, 396 P.3d 711 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Sections: 
• II.C.4. – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search Warrant 
Requirement / Other Circumstances in Which Limited Searches are Allowed Without a 
Warrant or Probable Cause / Intoxication 




 Ryce challenged the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025 after he withdrew his 
consent to a blood alcohol content breath test.57  K.S.A 2016 Supp 8-1025 made it a crime to 
refuse to submit to a BAC test after giving consent, regardless of whether the consent was 
explicit or implied.58  The Kansas Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional but agreed to 
stay its decision until the U.S. Supreme Court decided a similar case before it.59  In Ryce I, the 
Kansas Supreme Court interpreted K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025 to “penalize[] drivers who refuse 
to submit to a test that they have impliedly consented to . . ..”60  The Kansas Supreme Court 
concluded both breath and blood tests constituted a search and are per se unreasonable unless 
they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.61  The Kansas Supreme Court 
held that consent was the only constitutional basis to uphold breath and blood alcohol searches.62  
Additionally, the State cannot compel consent by threatening a criminal offense. In Birchfield, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that warrantless breath tests were valid under the searches incident 
to lawful arrest, but blood tests were not.63   
 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld its original determination in Ryce I.64  However, the 
court modified its holding to reflect Birchfield’s determination that breath tests could be justified 
under the search incident to lawful arrest exception.65  However, the search incident to lawful 
arrest exception does not always apply when “an officer demands submission to a blood alcohol 
content test.”66  Kansas statutes only allow an officer request a driver submit to a test; the officer 
cannot direct a test unless the driver consents or is unable to consent.67  The court held K.S.A. 
                                                   
57  State v. Ryce, 306 Kan. 682, 682, 396 P.3d 711, 711 (2017) (Ryce II). 
58  Id., 396 P.3d at 711–712 
59  See State v. Ryce 303 Kan. 899, 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (Ryce I); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. 
Ct. 2160 (2016). 
60  Ryce I, 303 Kan. at 907, 368 P.3d at 350. 
61  Id. at 909–914, 368 P.3d at 350–353. 
62  Ryce II, 306 Kan. at 686, 396 P.3d at 713. 
63  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184. 
64  Ryce II, 306 Kan. at 691, 396 P.3d at 717. 
65  Id. at 693, 396 P.3d at 717.  
66  Id. at 693, 396 P.3d at 718. 
67  Id. at 695, 396 P.3d at 719. 
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Supp. 2016 8-1025 unconstitutional because, while the state can punish failure to cooperate 
“with a warrant search or a search conducted pursuant to a warrant exception,” it cannot 
criminalize the withdrawal of implied consent to the test.68 
State v. Baker, 395 P.3d 422 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation:  State v. Baker, 306 Kan. 585, 395 P.3d 422 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Sections: 
• II.C.4.e – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search Warrant 
Requirement / Other Circumstances in Which Limited Searches are Allowed Without a 
Warrant or Probable Cause / Inventory Search After Arrest 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Baker appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered after 
the police completed an inventory search of his backpack after his arrest. 69   In Kansas, a 
warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls into an previously recognized exception.70  
“One ‘well-defined’ exception to the warrant requirement is the inventory search, which ‘is not an 
independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and 
preceding incarceration.’”71  Inventory searches do not rely on probable cause, and a lack of a 
warrant is immaterial to a search’s reasonableness.72  For an inventory search to be valid, law 
enforcement must have lawful custody of the property being inventoried.73  Baker argued that the 
police lacked lawful custody of his backpack because they failed to ask Baker want he wanted to 
do with it.74 
 The Kansas 75Supreme Court disagreed and held its precedents did not allow an arrested 
person to arrange for the removal of his possessions to avoid their placement in law 
enforcement’s inventory.  Impounding an arrested person’s possessions must be reasonable 
under the totality of the circumstances.76  The Kansas Supreme Court held the seizure of Baker’s 
backpack reasonable under the circumstances because the arrest occurred at a retail store.77  The 
U.S. Supreme Court previously held that inventory searches did not satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirements when law enforcement had “no policy whatever with respect to the 
opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search.”78  The Kansas Supreme 
                                                   
68  Id. at 698–699, 396 P.3d at 720. 
69  State v. Baker, 306 Kan. 585, 585, 395 P.3d 422, 424 (2017). 
70  Id. at 590, 395 P.3d at 427 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 278 Kan. 402, 404–05, 200 P.3d 94 (2004)). 
71  Id. (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 US 640, 643–44 (1983)). 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 591, 395 P.3d at 427. 
74  Id. at 591, 395 P.3d at 428. 
75  Id. at 592, 395 P.3d at 428. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Florida v. Wells, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). 
 8 
Court applied the Wells rule to the police’s search of Baker’s backpack.79  Under the Wells rule, 
law enforcement must have “standardized criteria or an established routine” to regulate opening 
containers found during an inventory search.80  The Kansas Supreme Court wrote that the policy 
could be opening all containers, no containers, or only those that officers cannot determine their 
content.81  The policy is not required to be written, but one must exist.82  The State has the 
burden to produce some evidence of a policy to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.83  The decision 
reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals’ finding that the search was constitutional and remanded 
the case.84 
State v. Wilson, No. 115,554, 2017 WL 3444509 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Wilson, No. 115,554, 2017 WL 3444509, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. August 
11, 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Sections:  
• II.C.4.e – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Exceptions to the Search Warrant 
Requirement / Other Circumstances in Which Limited Searches are Allowed Without a 
Warrant or Probable Cause / Inventory Search After Arrest 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Wilson appealed a district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
found during an inventory search of his SUV.85  Officer Gaines, who arrested Wilson, decided to 
impound and tow Wilson’s vehicle after arresting Wilson for driving with a suspended license.86  
At the time of her arrest, Wilson had parked her SUV in a manner which protruded into the 
entryway of a business parking lot.87  Because no one could come move the vehicle, Gaines asked 
Wilson for the name of her preferred towing company and proceeded to impound and tow the 
SUV.88  Before the tow arrived, however, Gaines conducted an inventory search of the SUV and 
found cocaine and drug paraphernalia.89  Both before and at her trial, Wilson challenged Gaines’s 
decision to impound her vehicle.90  Wilson argued that because Gaines’s decision to impound was 
                                                   
79  Baker, 306 Kan. at 593, 395 P.3d at 429. 
80  Id.  
81  Id.  
82  Id.. 
83  Id.  
84  Id.  
85  State v. Wilson, No. 115,554, 2017 WL 3444509, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. August 11, 2017). 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. at *2. 
90  Id.  
 9 
unreasonable, the subsequent inventory search and seizure was unlawful.91  The District Court 
denied Wilson’s motion to suppress.92 
 The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of Wilson’s motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from her SUV.93  To comport with the Fourth Amendment, the court 
stated that Gaines’s decision to impound must have been “reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances.”94  One circumstance the court considered was the fact that no statute or ordinance 
required Gaines to impound Wilson’s SUV.95  But that circumstance alone was not dispositive.96  
The court also considered the hazard posed by the placement of Wilson’s car in the entrance to a 
business parking lot and found that this hazard weighed in favor of impoundment.97  Additionally, 
the court stated that Gaines’s inquiry as to Wilson’s preferred handling of the SUV “weigh[ed] 
strongly in favor of a constitutionally reasonable impoundment” because “[t]he inquiry itself 
points toward an effort to act reasonably under the circumstances.”98  Finally, the court considered 
whether Gaines’s impoundment was subterfuge to search the vehicle, but found the fact that Gaines 
inquired about Wilson’s preferred handling cut against the possibility of subterfuge.99  Because 
the totality of the circumstances suggested that Gaines’ decision to impound was reasonable, the 
court held the search was constitutionally reasonable.100  
State v. Robinson, 410 P.3d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citations: State v. Robinson, 55 Kan. App. 2d 209, 410 P.3d 923 (2017)  
 
2016 CPS Section: II.G.3. – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Technology and Searches / 
Chemical Drug Tests 
 
Summary:  
Defendant was charged with refusal to submit to field sobriety testing in violation of K.S.A. 
2016 Supp. 8-1012, refusal to submit to testing in violation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025, and 
driving under the influence.101  Under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1012, any person who operates a 
vehicle in Kansas is deemed to have given consent to submit to a preliminary breath test 
                                                   
91  Id.. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. at *4. 
94  Id. at *3 (citing State v. Shelton, 278 Kan. 287, 293, 93 P.3d 1200 (Kan. 2004)).   
95  Id. (noting that neither the police department’s impoundment policy nor a statute mandated impoundment of 
Wilson’s vehicle).  
96   Id. 
97  Id. at *3 (citing Shelton and State v. Branstetter, 199 P.3d 1272, 40 Kan. App. 2d 1167, 1171(Kan. Ct. App. 
2009) for the proposition that an “unattended motor vehicle parked illegally or in a manner that could obstruct traffic 
present[s] a circumstance weighing in favor of impoundment. A motor vehicle can be considered unattended if the 
driver has been arrested an no one else is present to remove or lawfully park it.”)  
98  Id.  
99  Id. at *4. 
100  Id.  
101  State v. Robinson, 55 Kan.App.2d 209, 209, 410 P.3d 923, 923 (2017). 
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(“PBT”).102  Refusal to submit is a traffic infraction.103  The defendant moved to dismiss that 
charge, asserting that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1012 was facially unconstitutional.104   
The court held that a similar statute, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025, was unconstitutional in 
Ryce I and Ryce II.105  K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025 “imposes criminal penalties upon a motorist for 
refusing to submit to any method of blood-alcohol testing.”106  The court held that this was facially 
unconstitutional because it “criminalizes a defendant’s right to withdraw his or her consent to a 
warrantless search and it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”107 
 The court in Robinson held that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a PBT in violation 
of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1012 is unconstitutional because it criminalizes the right to withdraw 
consent from a warrantless search—the same reason the court used in Ryce I and Ryce II.108  The 
court compared the unconstitutional statute 8-1025 with statute 8-1012, and determined them to 
be substantially similar.109  Additionally, the court held that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1012 was not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.110  Ultimately, the court held that K.S.A. 
2016 Supp. 8-1012 was unconstitutional for the same reasons that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025 was 
unconstitutional, and reversed and vacated Robinson’s conviction on that count.111 
City of Dodge City v. Webb, 381 P.3d 464 (Kan. 2016) 
Full Case Citation: City of Dodge City v. Webb, 305 Kan. 351, 381 P.3d 464 (2016). 
 
2016 CPS Section: II.G.3. – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Technology and Searches / 
Chemical Drug Tests 
 
Summary: 
 Defendant Webb was convicted of driving under the influence after the trial court denied 
his motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content obtained from a breath test.112  The 
arresting officers threatened to get a warrant for a blood draw if Webb did not consent to the 
breath test.113  While Webb initially refused the breath test, after being instructed that the officers 
would obtain a warrant for a blood draw if he refused, Webb consented to the breath test. 
                                                   
102  K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1012. 
103  Id. 
104  Robinson, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 209, 410 P.3d at 923. –2. 
105  State v. Ryce, 303 Kan. 899, 368 P.3d 342 (2016) [hereinafter Ryce I]; State v. Ryce, 306 Kan. 683, 396 P.3d 
711 (2017) [hereinafter Ryce II]; see also infra fns. 57–68 and accompanying text.  
106  Robinson, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 211, 410 P.3d at 925.  
107  Id. (citing Ryce I, 303 Kan. at 699–700).  
108  Id. at 223, 410 P.3d at 931.  
109  Id. at 218–223, 410 P.3d at 929–931. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  City of Dodge City v. Webb, 305 Kan. 351, 351–52, 381 P.3d 464, 466 (2016). 
113  Id. 
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 Webb argued that, because of the threat to obtain a warrant for the blood draw, his 
consent was not lawfully obtained under the Kansas informed consent statute.114  However, the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers are statutorily entitled to obtain a 
warrant for a blood draw from a driver who refuses a breath test, so long as the warrant is 
supported by probable cause.115  Because the warrant in this case was supported by probable 
cause, the breath test was not unlawfully coerced and the evidence was admissible.116  The 
court’s decision overruled the Hoeffner decision from 2014.117 
 
Note:  
 This case is included to reflect a change in law from Hoeffner, cited in the 2016 Criminal 
Procedure Survey, which was not included in the 2017 Supplement.  
State v. Nece, 396 P.3d 709 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Nece, 306 Kan. 679, 396 P.3d 709 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: II.G.3. – Searches and the Fourth Amendment / Technology and Searches / 
Chemical Drug Tests 
 
Summary:  
 Law enforcement officers suspected Nece of driving under the influence and gave him an 
“informed consent advisory.”118  The advisory stated that if Nece refused to a breath test for 
blood alcohol content he may be charged with the separate crime of refusing to consent to such a 
test.119  The Kansas Supreme Court held that, in the light of its holding in State v. Ryce,120  
“Nece’s consent was unduly coerced because, contrary to the informed consent advisory, the 
State could not have constitutionally imposed criminal penalties if Nece had refused to submit to 
breath-alcohol testing.”121  Therefore, consent to a breath-alcohol test pursuant to an advisory 
that threatens non-submission with criminal penalties is considered coerced, and evidence 
resulting from such coerced consent is inadmissible.122 
                                                   
114  See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001. See also Hoeffner v. Kan. Dept. Revenue, 50 Kan. App. 2d 878, 335 P.3d 684 
(2014) (holding that a breath test consented to under threat of a warrant for a blood draw violates the implied 
consent statue).  
115  Webb, 305 Kan. at 356–57, 381 P.3d at 469.  
116  Id. at 358, 381 P.3d at 470. 
117  See Hoeffner, 50 Kan. App. 2d at 886–889, 335 P.3d at 691–92.  
118  State v. Nece, 306 Kan. 679, 679–80, 396 P.3d 709, 709–10 (2017). 
119  Id., 396 P.3d at 710.  
120  State v. Ryce, 306 Kan. 682, 396 P.3d 711 (Kan. 2017); see infra fns. 57–68 and accompanying text. 
121  Nece, 306 Kan. at 680, 396 P.3d at 710.  
122  The Kansas Supreme Court arrived at the same holding in State v. Nece, 303 Kan. 888, 367 P.3d 1260 (2016); 
the case was re-heard in the light of Birchfield v. N. Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016).  
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III. SEIZURES 
United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2017) 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.B.1. – Seizures / Types of Seizures and Reasonability / Seizure of Items 
 
Summary:  
Defendant, Thompson, appealed his conviction and sentence, contending that the district 
court erred in admitting cell-service location information (“CSLI”) obtained without a warrant.123  
Thompson argued that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to produce a warrant 
before obtaining a cell-phone user’s historical CSLI.124  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision to admit the CSLI.125 
 This is the first time the Tenth Circuit has confronted this issue.  The Tenth Circuit follows 
four other circuits in rejecting Thompson’s position by emphasizing the distinction that historic 
CSLI is collected by third-party service providers for their own business purposes, not the 
government.126   Further, like a pen register, CSLI is not a record of conversations between 
individuals, but is a record of the transmission of data that occurs to facilitate those 
conversations.127  As such, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that cell-phone users lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their historic CSLI.128 
State v. Maier, No. 115,248, 2017 WL 4216264 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Maier, No. 115,248, 2017 WL 4216264 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 
2017). 
 
2016 CPS Sections: III.B.2. – Seizures / Types of Seizures and Reasonability / Seizure of Persons 
 
Summary: 
 The State challenged the district court’s suppression of Maier’s post-Miranda statements 
made after being arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.129  Officers discovered Maier’s outstanding  
arrest warrant after unlawfully entering his hotel room to search for his girlfriend.130  However, 
the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision to suppress Maier’s statements 
                                                   
123  United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2017). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 1160. 
126  Id. at 1154–55. 
127  Id. at 1158. 
128  Id. at 1160. 
129  State v. Maier, No. 115,248, 2017 WL 4216264, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2017).  
130  Id. at *2–5. 
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after determining the discovery of Maier’s arrest warrant broke the casual chain between the 
unconstitutional entry of the hotel room and Maier’s post-Miranda statements.131 
 The Kansas Court of Appeals focused on United States Supreme Court case Utah v. Strieff, 
which held that an officer’s discovery of a valid, preexisting arrest warrant and the finding that the 
officer did not participate in any flagrantly unlawful police misconduct was enough to break the 
casual link between an unconstitutional stop and the discovery of evidence.132  By relying on 
Strieff, the Kansas Court of Appeals refused to rely on Kansas case State v. Moralez, “which found 
that a warrant is of minimal importance in an attenuation analysis.” 133  
State v. Lewis, 399 P.3d 250 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Lewis, 54 Kan. App. 2d 263, 399 P.3d 250 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.B.2.b. – Seizures / Types of Seizures and Reasonability / Seizure of Persons 
/ Detentions During Traffic Stops 
 
Summary:  
Defendant, Lewis, filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle by 
contending that the police unreasonably prolonged his traffic stop to obtain a dog sniff which led 
to the discovery of cocaine.134  The officer wrote Lewis a traffic ticket and checked for any 
outstanding warrants.135  However, the K-9 unit arrived shortly after and the dog sniff that led to 
the discovery of the cocaine occurred about five minutes after the completion of the traffic 
stop.136  The trial court denied Lewis’s motion to suppress the cocaine.137  
On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s holding, 
determining that the officer unreasonably prolonged Lewis’s traffic stop in violation of 
Rodriguez v. United States, which states that a dog sniff cannot prolong the stop beyond the time 
necessary to accomplish the original purpose of issuing a traffic citation.138  The court focused on 
the five minute delay following the completion of the traffic stop and the start of the dog sniff, 
finding this delay unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff.139  The court 
also determined that the officer artificially added time to the traffic stop to “stall” for the K-9 
unit to arrive.140  Thus, the court reversed Lewis’s conviction and remanded with instructions to 
grant his motion to suppress evidence.141 
                                                   
131  Id. at *11. 
132  Id. at *7–8; Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
133  Maier, 2017 WL 4216264, at *7 (citing State v. Moralez, 297 Kan. 397, 415, 300 P.3d 1090, 1102 (2013)). 
134  State v. Lewis, 54 Kan. App. 2d 263, 265, 399 P.3d 250, 253 (2017). 
135  Id. at 278, 399 P.3d at 261. 
136  Id. at 281, 399 P.3d at 262–63. 
137  Id. at 269, 399 P.3d at 253. 
138  Id. at 271, 282–84, 399 P.3d at 257, 263–64. 
139  Id. at 281–84, 399 P.3d at 262–63. 
140  Id. at 282, 399 P.3d at 263. 
141  Id. at 284, 399 P.3d at 264. 
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State v. Glover, 400 P.3d 182 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Glover, 54 Kan. App. 2d 377, 400 P.3d 182 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.B.2.b. – Seizures / Types of Seizures and Reasonability / Seizure of Persons 
/ Detentions During Traffic Stops 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Glover filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop, 
arguing that the officer initiated the stop without the necessary reasonable suspicion to believe a 
crime had been, was being, or was going to be committed.142  Glover argued that the officer’s 
reliance only on evidence showing that the registered owner of the vehicle had a suspended driver’s 
license is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that the owner of the vehicle is the person 
driving the vehicle.143  The district court granted Glover’s motion to suppress.144 
On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals disagreed, and reversed and remanded the district 
court’s decision to grant Glover’s motion to suppress. 145   Because Kansas courts had never 
confronted this narrow issue, the court followed guidance from other jurisdictions, holding that 
“an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a vehicle stop when (1) the officer knows that the 
registered owner of a vehicle has a suspended license and (2) the officer is unaware of any evidence 
or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of the vehicle.”146  Using this test, 
the court determined that the officer properly initiated the traffic stop to investigate whether Glover 
was driving his vehicle in violation of the law.147  
State v. Dannebohm, No. 116,981, 2017 WL 3447883 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Dannebohm, No. 116,981, 2017 WL 3447883 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 
11, 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.C. – Seizures / Standing to Object to Seizure  
 
Summary:  
The State appealed the district court’s finding that defendant Dannebohm had standing to 
pursue a motion to suppress evidence that he had methamphetamine inside a safe located in the 
apartment of a close friend, Tracy.148  The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed and held 
                                                   
142  State v. Glover, 54 Kan. App. 2d 377, 378, 400 P.3d 182, 184 (2017). 
143  Id. at 378, 400 P.3d at 184. 
144  Id. at 378, 400 P.3d at 184–85. 
145  Id. at 386, 400 P.3d at 188. 
146  Id. at 382, 400 P.3d at 186. 
147  Id. at 385, 400 P.3d at 188. 
148  State v. Dannebohm, No. 116,981, 2017 WL 3447883, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017). 
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Dannebohm lacked standing because he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy when police 
searched Tracy’s apartment.149   
The court distinguished the facts of the case from those in State v. Talkington, a seminal 
Kansas case concerning standing to object to a seizure.150  In Talkington:  
 
The court determined that the defendant did have an expectation of privacy in his 
host’s home because: (1) the defendant’s visit was not commercial in nature; (2) 
the defendant had been at his host’s home for a few hours before the officers 
arrived; (3) the defendant and his host had been friends for 7 or 8 years; (4) the 
defendant and host worked on cars and mopeds together; and (5) the defendant 
visited whenever he was in town, including the previous week.151 
 
The court in Dannebohm noted that, like the defendant in Talkington, Dannebohm had been friends 
with Tracy for several years, regularly visited her at her apartment for noncommercial reasons, 
had been at her apartment earlier on the day of the search, and kept personal possessions at the 
apartment.152  The key difference, the court determined, was that Dannebohm was not at Tracy’s 
home at the time of the search and was thus not a current guest at that time so as to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.153  Moreover, Dannebohm’s connection to the apartment was 
insufficient to support a reasonable expectation of privacy when he was not a current guest.  For 
example, Dannebohm did not have a key to the apartment, did not appear to have permission to 
enter the apartment in Tracy’s absence or to exclude others from entering the apartment, had never 
stayed the night, and had never left his car at the apartment.154 
 Dannebohm’s holding expanded upon Talkington’s standing analysis by drawing the 
distinction between a person’s expectation of privacy when present and not present at the time of 
a police search.  The case also provides important factual considerations for determining when a 
person, who is not a guest at the time of a search, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
another’s home. 
State v. Mattox, 390 P.3d 514 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Mattox, 305 Kan. 1015, 390 P.3d 514 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.D.2 – Seizures / Fifth & Sixth Amendment Issues / Applicability of the 
Sixth Amendment  
 
                                                   
149  Id. at *1, *6. 
150  301 Kan. 453, 345 P.3d 258 (2015). 
151  Dannebohm, 2017 WL 3447883, at *5 (citing Talkington, 301 Kan. at 479–80). 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at *5–6 (distinguishing the case from United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
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Summary:  
Defendant, Mattox, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, aggravated 
kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.155  Mattox, who asserted a mental disease or defect defense, 
argued, in part, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the State’s expert 
witness conducted a psychological evaluation on him without his counsel present.156  While the 
court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had not resolved the particular issue, it held that Mattox’s 
Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because the State’s psychiatric examination was not a 
“critical stage” of the proceedings against him.157  The court relied on its earlier decision in Brown 
and cited a plethora of state and federal courts that had held similarly.158  The court also affirmed 
the district court’s holdings that (1) Mattox’s question, “You all care if I get a lawyer in here?” 
was too ambiguous to have invoked his right to counsel during the police interrogation in which 
he confessed; and (2) his Miranda waiver and confession were knowing and voluntary despite 
evidence suggesting possible psychotic functioning, because there was substantial competent 
evidence supporting the district court’s determinations.159  Mattox is notable because it confirms 
that defendants in Kansas do not have a right to counsel during psychological evaluations, and 
provides an overview of Kansas’s approach to the right to counsel, Miranda waivers, and the right 
against self-incrimination. 
State v. Brown, 387 P.3d 835 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Brown, 305 Kan. 674, 387 P.3d 835 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.D.3.f. – Seizures / Fifth & Sixth Amendment Issues / Miranda Warnings & 
Interrogations / Invocation of the Right to Counsel  
 
Summary:  
Defendant Antonio Brown challenged his convictions of “felony murder, two counts of 
child abuse, and one count of interference with a law enforcement officer.”160 Defendant argued 
that his convictions should be reversed because the district court admitted incriminating 
statements that he made after invoking his right to counsel.161 The Kansas Supreme Court held 
                                                   
155  State v. Mattox, 305 Kan. 1015, 1016, 390 P.3d 514, 519 (2017). 
156  Id. at 1031, 390 P.3d at 528. 
157  Id. at 1053–54, 390 P.3d at 541. 
158  Id. at 1054–55, 390 P.3d at 541 (citing State v. Brown, 235 Kan. 688, 690, 681 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1984)). 
159  Mattox, 305 Kan. at 1036–45, 390 P.3d at 530–36. 
160  State v. Brown, 305 Kan. 674, 675, 387 P.3d 835, 840 (2017).  
161  Id. at 675, 387 P.3d at 840. Brown also argued that his convictions should be reversed because the district court 
did not give an instruction on a lesser included offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
conviction of interference with a law enforcement officer. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court found that the district 
court acted properly in not giving a lesser included offense because state law did not recognize a lesser included 
offense and the Defendant’s constitutional arguments failed. Id. at 687–88, 387 P.3d at 847–48. The Kansas 
Supreme Court also found that the evidence supports the Defendant’s conviction of interference with a law 
enforcement officer. Id. at 692, 387 P.3d at 850. 
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that the defendant “unequivocally” invoked his right to counsel when he asked for assistance in 
reaching his lawyer and when he attempted to call his attorney during the interview.162 The issue 
here was whether the defendant reinitiated the questioning after invoking his right to counsel, 
which would not be a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right.163  
The standard for determining whether a suspect waived his previously invoked right to 
counsel requires the court to determine “whether the accused (1) initiated further discussions 
with police and (2) knowingly and intelligently waived the previously asserted right.”164 The 
Kansas Supreme Court focused on the first element of the test. The court stated that whether a 
suspect wanted to reinitiate “turns on ‘both the content and context’ of the statement when 
‘viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer.’”165 After the defendant tried and failed to 
reach his lawyer, the defendant stated that “he understood ‘fully’ his rights,” he “would talk 
without an attorney present,” and he “had ‘nothing to hide.’”166 The court held that, by these 
statements, the defendant reinitiated the questioning and, thereby, waived his previously asserted 
right to counsel “knowingly and intelligently.”167 
United States v. Yepa, 862 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: United States v. Yepa, 862 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.D.3.f. – Seizures / Fifth & Sixth Amendment Issues / Miranda Warnings & 
Interrogations / Invocation of the Right to Counsel 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Yepa was convicted of first-degree felony murder in a New Mexico federal 
district court.168  Defendant challenged that conviction on the grounds that his incriminating 
statements “were the incriminating product of unlawful interrogation.”169  The defendant, who 
was arrested at his house, was advised of his Miranda rights and stated he wanted a lawyer.170  
Subsequently, he was taken to the Jemez Pueblo Police Department and FBI agents obtained a 
warrant to search his home and body for evidence of murder.171  The search of the defendant’s 
body took “50 minutes, was audio-recorded; [and] the recording was later transcribed.”172  The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[w]hat is striking from the recording is that 
                                                   
162  Id. at 681, 387 P.3d at 844. 
163  Id. at 682, 387 P.3d at 844. 
164  Id. at 683, 387 P.3d at 844 (quoting State v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939, 947, 80 P.3d 1132, 1138 (2003)).  
165 Id. at 683, 387 P.3d at 845 (quoting United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 623, 419 U.S. App. D.C. 210 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015)). 
166  Id. at 683, 387 P.3d at 845. 
167  Id.  
168  United States v. Yepa, 862 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2017). 
169  Id. at 1257. 
170  Id. at 1253. 
171  Id. at 1253–54. 
172  Id. at 1254. 
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Defendant's incriminating statements are scattered throughout, without any apparent connection 
to what is going on at the time, and that the officers are focused on performing their search, 
rarely reacting in any way to what Defendant says about the offense.”173 
The defendant sought to suppress the statements he made during the body search.174  The 
Court of Appeals stated that for the Defendant to succeed at suppressing those statements, he 
must prove they “were (1) the result of words or actions of law-enforcement officers (2) that 
constituted interrogation.”175  The court held that the defendant failed to meet this burden.176  
First, the court determined the search itself was not an interrogation because it was a common 
action of arrest and custody.177  The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the 
Defendant’s statements “were spontaneous and were not the result of interrogation.”178 The court 
stated that questions regarding who the defendant was referring to “were simply neutral efforts to 
clarify [his] spontaneous, volunteered statements, and did not constitute interrogation.”179  The 
court also stated that the question “who were you with?” could have appeared to be pressing the 
point, but they did not need to address whether those could be considered interrogation because 
the “Defendant never answered the questions.”180  The Court of Appeals, finding no error in 
admitting the statements, affirmed the Defendant’s conviction.181 
State v. Guein, 388 P. 3d 194 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Guein, 53 Kan. App. 2d 394, 388 P. 3d 194 (2017), review granted, 
2017 Kan. LEXIS 813 (Kan., Sept. 29, 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: III.D.3.g. – Seizures / Fifth & Sixth Amendment Issues / Miranda Warnings 
& Interrogations / Statements Made During Police Interrogation 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Guein appealed his conviction for two drug-related offenses claiming that the 
confession he made to police while in custody was involuntary and  should not have been admitted 
at trial.182  Police detained Guein because of a strong marijuana smell coming from his car.183  The 
officer handcuffed him and walked him to the police car.184  Before reading him his Miranda rights, 
                                                   
173  Id.  
174  Id. at 1258. 
175  Id. 
176  Id.  
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 1258–59 (quoting R., Vol. 4 at 1136). 
179  Id. at 1259 (quoting R., Vol. 4 at 1136). 
180  Id. at 1260. 
181  Id. 
182  State v. Guein, 53 Kan. App. 2d 394, 388 P. 3d 194 (2017), review granted, 2017 Kan. LEXIS 813 (Sept. 29, 
2017). 
183  Id. at 397, 388 P.3d at 198.  
184  Id. at 397–98, 388 P.3d at 198.  
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the officer told Guein not to “fuck with him” several times, indicating that if Guein cooperated, he 
would have nothing to worry about.185  Guein was later read his Miranda rights after about 10 
minutes in the police car.186  The district court denied Guein’s request to have his pre- and post-
Miranda statements suppressed, holding that the officers were justified in their statements and that 
Guein had voluntarily waived his rights.187  
The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding Guein’s post-Miranda statements should 
have been suppressed because the officer’s warning not to “fuck” with him constituted a threat and 
negated the Miranda warning.188  The court used the standard laid out in State v. Randolph to assess 
whether the officer’s statements were coercive.189  The court held that “[t]aken in context, a 
reasonable person would conclude that [the officer] made an implied threat of physical violence 
and connected it to answering the questions [the officer] would soon be asking in a way that 
conformed with [the officer’s] understanding.”190  The statements were made only after Guein’s 
hands were handcuffed.191  Guein was also left in the police car for 10 minutes before he was given 
his Miranda warning.192  
While the court took special care to quote the officer’s vulgar language, it also went out of 
its way to state that the vulgar language was not the deciding factor in this case:  
 
The use of profanity here simply amplified the serious nature of the statements 
being made . . . It’s only because that language was accompanied by words 
conveying additional messages—that [the officer] was going to be asking more 
questions, that [the officer] expected cooperation when he did so, and that [the 
officer] might “fuck with” Guein if he didn’t cooperate—that tip the balance here 
strongly in Guein’s favor when we consider whether the State proved the statements 
were made voluntarily.193 
IV. PRE-TRIAL ISSUES 
State v. Mosby, No. 115,598, 2017 WL 2610765 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Mosby, No. 115,598, 2017 WL 2610765 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Sections: IV.A.1. – Pre-Trial Issues / Formal Charges / Charging Instruments: Complaint, 
Information, and Indictment 
 
                                                   
185  Id. at 397–98, 388 P.3d at 198. 
186  Id. at 399, 388 P.3d at 199. 
187  Id. at 401–02, 388 P.3d at 200. 
188  See generally id. at 408–15, 388 P.3d at 204–08.  
189  297 Kan. 320, 301 P.3d 300 (2013). 
190  Guein, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 410, 388 P. 3d at 205. 
191  Id. at 410, 388 P.3d at 205. 
192  Id. at 411, 388 P.3d at 205. 
193  Id. at 411–12, 388 P.3d at 206. 
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Summary:  
Defendant, Mosby, challenged his sentence on the grounds that “[t]he State did not 
provide adequate notice of the theft charge against him because the charging document did not 
list all of the items the State alleged at trial he stole.”194  The charging document alleged the 
defendant stole property “including but not limited to 20 specific items.”195  However, the 
defendant was unaware of each “specific item” the State alleged he stole and claimed he was 
therefore unable “to prepare an adequate defense.”196  The court excused his failure to raise the 
issue below because the defendant’s fundamental Due Process rights were denied by the lack of 
notice provided by the charging document.197  The court’s holding in this case clarified the due 
process/notice safeguard that protects defendants against insufficient pleadings retained by the 
Kansas Supreme Court after State v. Dunn.198  In Dunn, the court noted that insufficiency to 
provide the defendant with adequate due process and notice is one of three avenues to challenge 
a charging document.199 
Brown v. State, No. 116,744, 2017 WL 4455306 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: Brown v. State, 404 P.3d 358 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: 
•  IV.A.2. – Pre-Trial Issues / Formal Charges / Bill of Particulars 
• IV.B.1. – Pre- Trial Issues / Initial Appearances / Speedy Public Trial  
 
Summary: 
The Defendant, Brown, wished to plead guilty to the State’s charges200  The trial court 
requested a proffer of evidence to support his plea.201  However, the Defendant did not wish to 
offer additional evidence, but to plead guilty only to the facts alleged in the State’s charging 
documents.202 Later, the trial court plead not guilty on his behalf.203  On appeal, the Defendant 
argued that “because K.S.A. 22-3201 requires a charging document to include ‘the essential facts 
constituting the crime charged,’ his charging document should have been sufficient to support his 
guilty pleas.”204  However, the court held that K.S.A. 22-3201 does not apply to pleas, but 
instead applies to “the sufficiency of charging documents in the context of due process.”205   This 
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holding clarified that K.S.A. 22-3201 was drafted to create a remedy when a defendant’s due 
process rights are violated, not to support pleas.  
State v. Robinson, 399 P.3d 194 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Robinson, 306 Kan. 1012, 399 P.3d 194 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: IV.B.1. – Pre- Trial Issues / Initial Appearances / Speedy Public Trial  
 
Summary: 
 After a conviction for aggravated burglary, aggravated theft, and criminal damage to 
property, Robinson appealed his verdict and subsequent affirmation by the Kansas Court of 
Appeals, claiming seven errors at trial.206  At issue in the case was his assertion that his speedy 
trial rights under K.S.A. 22-3402 were violated.207  
 Robinson asserted a violation of his speedy trial rights because the district court granted 
the State an improper continuance.208  The State requested this continuance because a material 
witness – a medical doctor – was unavailable due to a “traveling rotation” that would have 
placed him out of the area during the scheduled trial dates.209  The trial court granted the 
continuance under K.S.A. 22-3402(5)(c), extending the trial schedule by 90 days, which 
Robinson asserted was beyond his speedy trial time.210 
 Robinson asserted the continuance was improper because the medical doctor was not 
truly unavailable, only inconvenienced.211  Relying on State v. George, Robinson asserted that 
the state failed to provide sufficient evidence that the doctor was truly unavailable.212  The Court 
agreed, noting that the record was “slim,” and that the State had produced no evidence to back up 
their claim of unavailability.213 
 However, Robinson’s assertions ultimately failed because his counsel did not timely 
object to the continuance request.214  While he did object generally to the request for a 
continuance, he did not specifically object to the doctor’s unavailability, even when offered an 
opportunity to do so.215  Thus, the Court rejected his claim of speedy trial error because the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuance in the absence of a preserved 
objection.216 
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 This case emphasizes two points for attorneys in similar situations.  First, if declaring a 
witness unavailable, counsel should state with specificity the reasons the witness qualifies for 
unavailability under the Kansas Rules of Evidence.  Second, when preserving an objection for 
appeal, a general objection is not sufficient: a record must be made of exactly which claims or 
assertions a party is objecting to. 
State v. McDaniel, 395 P.3d 429 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. McDaniel, 306 Kan. 595, 395 P.3d 429 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: IV.D.1. – Pre-Trial Issues / Preliminary Hearing / Right to Preliminary Hearing 
 
Summary: 
In State v. McDaniel, Defendant, McDaniel, challenged his forced absence at several 
stages of his preliminary hearing.217  Prior to his preliminary hearing, McDaniel filed a pro se 
motion to dismiss his case.218  During the hearing, his counsel refused to present his motion, and 
the judge refused to listen to McDaniel present it because he already had counsel.219  McDaniel 
then sought to present an oral motion to remove his counsel, which both the judge and 
McDaniel’s attorney told him had to be in writing.220  After the hearing, the judge closed the 
record and sent the court into recess.221  However, after McDaniel left, the judge reopened the 
hearing record to record his observations regarding McDaniel’s interactions with his attorney.222 
Kansas courts recognize that while defendants have a constitutional right “to be present at every 
critical stage of the proceedings,” this “right is not unqualified.”223  Specifically, defendants 
should be present at “any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if the 
defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.”224  
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that a defendant does have the right to be at the 
reopening of the preliminary hearing record.225  The court held that since “the issue addressed at 
the proceeding bore on [McDaniel’s] opportunity to defend himself at trial. . . his participation 
was necessary to fairly resolve it.”226  The State attempted to argue that this did not constitute a 
critical stage of the proceeding, but the court noted that the only reason for the judge opening the 
record back up was “to preserve the observation for others who might later review whether 
McDaniel deserved a new attorney.”227  Thus, the court concluded that McDaniel’s constitutional 
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and statutory rights were violated. However, the court concluded that the violation of 
McDaniel’s right constituted a harmless error.228  
Wahl v. State, No. 114,888, 2017 WL 3668917 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2017)  
Full Case Citation: Wahl v. State, No. 114,888, 2017 WL 3668917 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 
2017). 
 




In Wahl v. State, the Defendant Wahl had problems with several of his previously-
appointed attorneys.229  Eventually, Wahl filed a pro se motion requesting an evidentiary hearing 
where he could present additional claims against one of his past appointed attorneys.230  The 
court granted his request and appointed new counsel to represent Wahl.231  Before the 
evidentiary hearing, a preliminary hearing ultimately had the characteristics of an evidentiary 
hearing, so the judge determined that a formal evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.232  Wahl’s 
attorney agreed.233  After the hearing, the court ruled that Wahl had not adequately shown 
ineffective assistance of counsel.234  After the ruling, Wahl mailed a pro se objection regarding 
the denial of an evidentiary hearing.235  Further, Wahl appealed the decision of the court, stating 
that the denial of the evidentiary hearing violated due process.236  Specifically, Wahl claimed, 
“he was deprived of notice that the entirety of [his] claim was to be determined in the 
hearing.”237 
The Kansas Court of Appeals ruled that Kansas law does not allow for this type of hybrid 
representation and therefore the Wahl was not denied due process since he was represented by 
counsel.238  The court pointed to the fact that Wahl was represented by counsel at the hearing and 
that “[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to both self-representation and the 
assistance of counsel.”239  The court further stated that “a defendant who is represented by 
counsel cannot dictate matters such as what witnesses to call or what motions to call.240  The 
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court concluded that the state’s hybrid representation rule did apply to pro se motions, therefore 
pro se motions generally do not carry any legal weight when the person is currently represented 
by counsel.241   
State v. Johnson, No. 110,837, 2017 WL 4558235 (Kan. Ct. App. October 13, 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Johnson, No. 110,837, 2017 WL 4558235 (Kan. Ct. App. October 
13, 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: IV.F.1. – Pre-Trial Issues / Jurisdiction & Venue / Jurisdiction 
 
Summary: 
 Defendant Johnson appealed his conviction on two counts of criminal solicitation to 
commit first-degree murder of his former wife.242  Johnson was charged with three counts of 
criminal solicitation pursuant to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5303 based on his separate and distinct 
interactions with three different people.243  One of these interactions was with an undercover 
detective from the Olathe Police Department.244  Part of Johnson’s interaction with the officer was 
a $3,000 down payment that occurred in Missouri.245   Johnson claimed the Kansas criminal 
solicitation statute was unconstitutional for vagueness and that jurisdiction was lacking.246 
 Johnson raised these issues for the first time on appeal, but the appellate court determined 
it had jurisdiction because Johnson argued the statute was facially invalid, and not invalid applied 
to his facts alone.247  The court determined that the statute was constitutional and not vague 
because the term “encouraging” used in the statute (1)  was “clear and unambiguous”,248 (2) 
“[gave] fair warning of the proscribed conduct and adequately guards against arbitrary and 
unreasonable enforcement”,249 and (3) was not an unreasonable restriction of First Amendment 
free speech rights.250   
 The court also determined that the part of the commission of the crime occurred in Missouri 
is irrelevant.251  Under Kansas law, a criminal defendant is subject to prosecution in the state if the 
crime is committed “wholly or partly within this state.”252   
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United States v. Trinh, No. 17-MJ-90007-GEB, 2017 WL 3675102 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 2017) 
Full Case Citation: United States v. Trinh, No. 17-MJ-90007-GEB, 2017 WL 3675102 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 25, 2017) 
 
2016 CPS Section: IV.F.1. – Pre-Trial Issues / Jurisdiction & Venue / Jurisdiction 
 
Summary: 
 The district court considered Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of venue on her charge 
of promoting obscenity by recklessly transmitting obscene material.253  Defendant lived in Texas, 
but her boyfriend was a U.S. Army soldier stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas.254  He sent her an 
obscene photograph by e-mail, which Defendant then forwarded to three of her boyfriend’s co-
workers.255  Defendant was charged in Kansas under the Assimilated Crimes Act which utilizes 
state law to fill in the gaps in federal law when a defendant commits an offense on property of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction that is only punishable by state law.256  To determine whether venue 
was proper, the district court looked to the intent of the Kansas “promotion of  obscenity” statute 
to determine if it was intended to apply to material originating out of state.257 
 Under K.S.A. § 21-6401(a)(1), a person promotes obscenity when she recklessly 
“transmit[s]. . . any obscene material.”258  The court determined that the act of “transmission” 
requires both a sender and a recipient, and that receiving the material is a “constituent and material 
element of the offense.”259  Therefore, under the Kansas statute, the court held jurisdiction was 
proper because the crime was partly committed within the state of Kansas.260   
State v. Beck, 406 P.3d 377 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Beck, 307 Kan. 108, 406 P.3d 377 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: IV.J.1. – Pre-Trial Issues / Plea Agreements / Recent Plea Agreement Cases 
 
Summary: 
Beck entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to first-degree murder 
and attempted first-degree murder.261  In exchange for the pleas, the State agreed to “recommend 
to the sentencing court that the sentences be ordered to run concurrently.”262  However, “despite 
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the parties’ joint recommendation, the court decided to run the sentences consecutively rather 
than concurrently.”263  Beck appealed, arguing that the “court erred when it refused to follow the 
plea agreement’s recommendation.”264  
An abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion occurs when the court’s “decision is (1) 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of 
fact.”265  Beck argued that the district court’s decision to run the sentences consecutively was 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable “because he accepted responsibility for his actions and spared 
the victim’s family and the State from the pain and expense of trial.”266  However, the Kansas 
Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, noting the district court’s 





V. TRIAL RIGHTS  
United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 436 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: V.A.2. – Trial Rights / Fifth Amendment Issues / Immunity 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Williston beat his girlfriend’s daughter to death while she was at work.268  
Months after the initial police report was filed, and while Williston was in an Oklahoma jail for a 
separate state-level charge, FBI agents served a grand jury subpoena on him relating to the 
murder of his ex-girlfriend’s daughter.269  The subpoena included a rare “Advice of Rights” 
section, which advised Williston that he could “refuse to answer any question if a truthful answer 
to the question would tend to incriminate [him].”270  Williston duly attended the grand jury 
proceedings, and at questioning waived his right to answer non-incriminating questions, 
choosing instead to answer all questions.271  After large portions of his grand jury testimony were 
read during his seven-day trial, a jury found Williston guilty of the murder, and “[t]he district 
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court sentenced [him] to life without parole,” per 18 U.S.C. § 3559(d) for his crime against a 
child.272  
On appeal to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Williston argued that his questioning 
before the grand jury violated his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment 
since he was not Mirandized or warned of his rights prior to the grand jury testimony. 273  The 
court denied these complaints for two very important reasons.  First, the court found that 
Williston was told “three times that he could refuse to answer any grand-jury question if he felt 
the answer would incriminate him,” which provided sufficient notice given the context.274  
Second, and most importantly, the court determined that witnesses testifying at grand jury 
proceedings are not read Miranda warnings because “grand-jury witnesses are not in custody 
while testifying, and that grand-jury questioning is not interrogation,” so Miranda is not violated 
by coercion in these situations.275  The court went on to say granting such Miranda rights “would 
destroy a key part of the grand jury's investigative power. . . . This absolute right to remain silent 
. . . would hobble the grand jury's ability to get to the bottom of crimes,” so it refused to expand 
Miranda.276 
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct 1899 (U.S. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct 1899 (U.S. 2017). 
 




Defendant Weaver requested a new trial when defense counsel failed to object to the 
courtroom being closed to the public for two days during the jury selection process.277  Weaver 
claimed his attorney's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, entitling him 
to a new trial.278 
The pool of potential jury members for Weaver’s trial was large and the assigned 
courtroom could not accommodate all the potential jurors, so the judge ordered the officer of the 
court to exclude all members of the public.279  When Weaver’s mother and minister showed up 
to observe jury selection, they were turned away.280  Weaver’s mother told defense counsel 
about the occurrence, but defense counsel told her this was constitutional.281  
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The jury convicted Weaver of murder and sentenced him to life. Five years later, Weaver 
filed motion for a new trial.282  The trial court ruled Weaver and the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed that Weaver failed to show defense counsel’s conduct caused prejudice 
warranting a new trial.283  The U.S. Supreme Court held although the public-trial right is 
structural, it is subject to exceptions, which suggests that not every public-trial violation results 
in fundamental unfairness. 284   
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (U.S. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (U.S. 2017). 
 




This case forced the Court to address a conflict between the no-impeachment rule and a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury free from racial bias.285 A Colorado trial court convicted 
Peña-Rodriguez of “harassment and unlawful sexual contact.”286  After trial, two jurors told 
defense counsel—later cemented in an affidavit—that during deliberation another juror 
repeatedly made statements indicating he thought Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because of his 
Hispanic heritage.287  The juror reportedly restated this belief in several iterations including: “‘I 
think he did it because he's Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want’”288 and “‘nine 
times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young 
girls.’”289   
Despite finding bias, the trial court denied Peña-Rodriguez’s petition for a new trial.  The 
Colorado Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Colorado both affirmed on appeal because the 
juror testimony did not fit within existing exceptions for examining the validity of a verdict listed 
in Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b).290  The Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari.291 
In a 5–3 decision, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion reversed the state courts and 
created the first constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule.292  The Court held that, 
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while safeguards permitting the examination of juror bias before final judgement are sufficient in 
almost all cases, racial bias influencing the decision of a juror violates the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right (applied through the Fourteenth Amendment), and severely obstructs courts 
from administering just decisions.293  However, not all types of racial bias rise to the level 
necessary to waive the no-impeachment rule.  The bias must “cast serious doubt on the fairness 
and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and resulting verdict” and “show that racial animus 
was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict.”294  The Court held the alleged 
conduct of the juror met that threshold and the impeachment evidence questioning the validity of 
the verdict should be admitted.295 
State v. Chapman, 392 P.3d 1285 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Chapman, 306 Kan. 266, 392 P.3d 1285 (2017). 
 




Trial court convicted Chapman of first-degree murder.  Chapman appealed, arguing the 
court should have granted his motion for change of venue to prevent a prejudicial jury.296  
Chapman claimed media coverage about his family, neck tattoo spelling “murder” backwards, 
and personal background tainted the entire jury pool in his home county.297  Chapman asserted 
this coverage was enough to meet the presumed-prejudice test, but the trial court denied each of 
his petitions under the Skilling factors test.298   
 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that while significant media coverage—
locally or nationally—could conceivably sway some of the factors in Chapman’s favor, media 
coverage alone does not prove a prima facie instance of presumed prejudice.299  In fact, media 
coverage could be a neutral factor in determining if a change in venue is necessary.300  If a story 
has substantial statewide or national coverage, then the prejudicial jury risk could be just as high 
in other jurisdictions.301  Chapman needed evidence showing the difference between local and 
regional jury pools that could not be easily reconciled through normal voir dire.302 
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Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) 
Full Case Citation: Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: V.B.5.b.ii. – Trial Rights / Sixth Amendment Issues / Right to Counsel/ 
Personal Choice / Right to Counsel of Choice 
 
Summary: 
In a claim under Strickland v. Washington, counsel is ineffective if the representation 
falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness” and the defendant was prejudiced by this 
incompetence (i.e., the error was not harmless).303  In Lee v. United States, the issue was whether 
the Defendant Lee was prejudiced by his counsel’s incompetence when his counsel gave him the 
erroneous advice that pleading guilty to an aggravated felony would not have deportation 
consequences. 304    
The Defendant had lived in the United States for most of his life, owned businesses in the 
United States, and had “never returned to South Korea” after moving to the United States.305  
While running his legal businesses, it appeared the Defendant also had an illegal business selling 
drugs.306  The Government offered the Defendant a plea bargain.307  As a lawful permanent 
resident, defendant worried about being deported and repeatedly asked his attorney whether his 
immigration status would be affected if he pleaded guilty.308  His attorney incorrectly assured 
him numerous times that pleading guilty would not have deportation consequences. 309  On the 
basis of this incorrect advice, the Defendant accepted the deal.310   
The Defendant argued his counsel was ineffective and the conviction should be vacated 
because he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known he could be deported.311  The district 
court denied relief.312  It reasoned that the Defendant was not prejudiced by the error because the 
Government had substantial evidence against the Defendant and the Defendant likely would have 
gone to prison longer and faced deportation anyway if he had gone to trial.313  The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling.314 
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The Supreme Court reversed both the district court and the Sixth Circuit.315  It held that the 
relevant inquiry was not whether the defendant was prejudiced because he would have succeeded 
at trial.316  Rather, the relevant inquiry was whether the defendant was prejudiced because he 
would have gone to trial if he had been properly advised.317  This inquiry is extremely fact-
specific. 318    
The court rejected the government’s argument that a defendant with “no viable defense” 
per se could not be prejudiced by denial of his right to trial.319  While many defendants with no 
defense and a small chance of winning would likely prefer a plea bargain to the risk of trial and 
therefore would not be prejudiced by denial of their right to trial, in some cases defendants might 
prefer to take their chances at trial and therefore would be prejudiced by denial of that right.320  
The Court found in the unusual circumstances of this case, where deportation was the 
“determinative issue,” there was a reasonable probability that defendant would have chosen a 
trial that would “[a]lmost certainly” lead to deportation over a plea bargain that would “certainly 
lead to deportation.”321  Thus, because of counsel’s incompetence, defendant suffered prejudice 
under the Strickland standard.322 
United States v. Williamson, 859 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 2017)  
Full Case Citation: United States v. Williamson, 859 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 2017), petition for 
cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 18, 2017) (No. 17-6373). 
 
2016 CPS Section: V.B.5.b.ii. – Trial Rights / Sixth Amendment Issues / Right to Counsel/ 
Personal Choice / Right to Counsel of Choice 
 
Summary:  
Defendant Williamson challenged his sentence on the grounds that the district court abused 
its discretion in denying his motion for new counsel.323  He argued that his attorney had a per se 
conflict of interest after Defendant filed a criminal complaint against the attorney.324  The Tenth 
Circuit disagreed.325  It held that “filing, or threatening to file, a criminal or ethical complaint 
against an attorney does not per se create a conflict of interest requiring substitution of 
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counsel.”326  It reasoned that while “[a] defendant's grievance against his attorney may establish 
good cause for substitution of counsel,” merely filing a complaint against an attorney is not 
dispositive of whether the attorney had an actual conflict.327   
The Tenth Circuit looked to the Second, Fourth, and Eight Circuits for authority on the 
issue.328  These circuit courts hold that the mere fact a defendant filed a disciplinary grievance 
against an attorney does not necessarily create a conflict of interest such that the attorney’s 
performance would be adversely affected.329  The Fourth Circuit noted it would be in the 
attorney’s best interest to do a good job if the attorney knew she might undergo disciplinary 
proceedings about it later.330  Further, the these courts reasoned that adopting an automatic 
reversal rule could lead to potential problems with defendants trying to “game the system” by 
filing disciplinary reports in hopes of getting a new attorney on the “eve of trial.”331  For similar 
reasons, the Tenth Circuit also declined to adopt a per se rule that filing, or threatening to file, a 
criminal or ethical complaint against an attorney “creates a conflict of interest requiring 
substitution of counsel.”332  Rather, the Tenth Circuit held, the court must determine whether an 
attorney is actually “torn between two different interests.”333  Here, statements by the attorney 
indicated he was concerned about how the record would look on appeal, but not concerned about 
the allegations defendant had made against him.334  This indicated he was not torn between two 
interests and therefore the district court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for new 
counsel.335 
Khalil-Alsalaami v. State, 399 P.3d 264, (2017) 
Full Case Citation: Khalil-Alsalaami v. State, 399 P.3d 264, 54 Kan. App. 2d 235 (2017). 
 




 Defendant, Khalil-Alsalaami, challenged his conviction by bringing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under K.S.A. § 60-1507 for failing to provide him with an interpreter 
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during trial.336  Kansas provides a statutory right to an interpreter.337  Whether the defendant’s 
English is at such a level that he or she is entitled to an interpreter depends on factors such as 
“the complexity of the proceedings, the defendant’s knowledge of English, and the testimony 
presented during trial.”338  The defendant here, who worked as a translator with American 
soldiers in Iraq, primarily spoke Arabic and knew limited English.339  While the defendant’s 
lawyer acknowledged he would have difficulty understanding portions of the trial without an 
interpreter,340 the lawyer, fearing the jury would believe the defendant was hiding behind a non-
existent language barrier, advised the defendant against using an interpreter.341 
 The court found the defendant’s counsel ineffective.342  Turning first to the deficiency 
question, the court found the attorney failed to test the defendant’s English abilities despite 
knowing that the defendant would be unable to understand certain portions of the trial 
testimony.343  Additionally, the trial involved complex technical information about DNA 
transference, and the defendant faced a lengthy prison sentence if convicted.344  Nor did the 
attorney explain to the defendant that he had a statutory right to an interpreter.345  Finally, the 
attorney could have addressed the fear of a jury’s negative inference through voir dire and a jury 
instruction.346  Noting the defendant was not proficient enough in English to proceed to trial 
without an interpreter and that a reasonable attorney would not place a trial strategy ahead of the 
defendant’s interest in understanding the trial, the court found the attorney was deficient.347 
 Turning to prejudice, the court relied on State v. Calderon, where the Kansas Supreme 
Court presumed prejudice when a court instructed an interpreter to not translate closing 
arguments.348  Since Khalil-Alsalaami had been denied an interpreter for the entire trial, the court 
found the denial to be much worse than in Calderon.349  The court held that the defendant was 
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State v. Dartez, No. 115,567, 2017 WL 3112819 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Dartez, No. 115,567, 2017 WL 3112819 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: V.C.1 – Trial Rights / Evidentiary Issues / Prior Actions by the Defendant  
 
Summary: 
In a domestic dispute, Section 60–455(b) evidence of prior acts of domestic violence or 
marital dispute may be offered to demonstrate the nature of the relationship of the parties.351  The 
nature of the relationship of the parties is relevant and material if it refutes an argument that the 
victim was the initial aggressor or is indicative of the motive of the defendant.352  In Dartez, the 
Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and battery of a woman he had been in 
a romantic relationship with, however she had expressed her desire to end the relationship.353  
Appellant challenged the admittance of prior incidents of domestic violence against the victim 
that occurred a month before the conduct that led to his conviction based on the second and third 
prongs of admissibility.354  Disagreeing, the Court discussed how the nature of the relationship 
between the Appellant and the victim both refuted the Appellant’s argument that the victim was 
the initial aggressor and that he was unwilling to let the victim end the relationship, which 
manifested in escalating violence towards the victim.355     
State v. Perez, 396 P.3d 78 (Kan. 2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Perez, 396 P.3d 78 (Kan. 2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: V.C.1 – Trial Rights / Evidentiary Issues / Prior Actions by the Defendant 
 
Summary: 
In Perez, the court clarified that evidence brought in under Section 60–455(d) does not 
require the trial court to give limiting instructions to the jury, as it would when admitting any 
other form of prior act evidence, when a defendant is charged with a sex crime because the 
evidence is admissible for any purpose.356  In 2017, the most common claim on appeal regarding 
the admissibility of prior act evidence was that the trial court improperly failed to give limiting 
instructions.357  The Court’s discussion on limiting instructions resolves confusion regarding the 
obligation of the trial court to give limiting instructions on prior sexual acts where the victim is 
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the same and the conduct at issue is of the same character as the underlying crime.358  Because 
evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible for any relevant matter, trial courts do not 
have to give a limiting instruction when introducing sexual misconduct of the same character as 
the underlying crime a defendant is charged with.359 
Further, the Court discussed Section 60–455 evidence admissibility and review, and 
clarified that trial courts must use a three-part,  not a four-part, test to determine the admissibility 
of prior act evidence.360  Trial courts considering the admissibility of prior acts must determine 
(1) whether the fact to be proven by the evidence is material, (2) whether the evidence is relevant 
to a disputed fact, and (3) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for 
undue prejudice.361  In Perez, the Appellant only took issue with the first prong of the 
admissibility test and argued that a limiting instruction was required because the evidence 
admitted of numerous deaths, insurance payouts, and disturbing sexual crimes against minors 
associated with the Appellant should not have been admitted because, especially the sexual acts, 
were immaterial and highly prejudicial.362  The Court disagreed.363  The Appellant was convicted 
of first-degree premeditated murder, sexual exploitation of a child, eight counts of rape, seven 
counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, three counts of aggravated assault, and eight counts of 
making false information.364  The prior act evidence was more probative than prejudicial and was 
of the same character as the charges against the Appellant.365  
State v. Williams, 306 Kan. 175; 392 P.3d 1267 (2017) 
Full Case Citation: State v. Williams, 306 Kan. 175; 392 P.3d 1267 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: V.C.5. – Trial Rights / Evidentiary Issues / Cross-Examination 
 
Summary: 
 After a jury convicted Defendant Williams of distribution of methamphetamine, Williams 
appealed the district court’s admittance of an audio recording of statements from a non-testifying 
informant.366  Williams argued that admitting the statements violated his Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation because the informants’ statements were testimonial in nature.367  The informant 
met with KBI Agent Lind and arranged for Lind to purchase meth from Williams.368  Lind wore a 
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body wire during the purchase and recorded audio of the entire transaction.369  Portions of the 
audio contained statements of the informant, who, although subpoenaed to testify, did not appear 
at trial.370  The district court admitted the entire audio recording in as evidence, finding that the 
informant’s statements were not testimonial in nature and therefore did not violate Williams’ right 
of confrontation.371  A panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding, 
relying on a four-factor test from State v. Brown to determine whether the statements in the audio 
recordings were testimonial.372  
The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s strict application of the Brown 
factors to determine whether a statement qualifies as testimonial.  The court noted that the factors 
in Brown “were based on precedent from the United States Supreme Court and [the Kansas 
Supreme Court] then available.”373  The Brown test was, in other words, “a creature of its time.”374  
And because the United States Supreme Court decided several Confrontation Clause cases 
defining the scope of testimonial statements since Brown, the Kansas Supreme Court determined 
that an analysis of those decisions was necessary to determine whether the admission of the 
informant’s statements violated Williams’ right to confrontation.375   
The court then reviewed Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases to determine the 
validity of admitting the informant’s statements.376   After reviewing those cases, the Kansas 
Supreme Court concluded that Brown’s factors were no longer the “exclusive or all-encompassing 
template for determining whether a statement made by an absent declarant qualifies as 
testimonial.”377  Most importantly for Williams, the lower court’s application of Brown’s factors 
relied heavily “on the fact that the informant's statements were not made during a police 
interrogation.”378  However, the Supreme Court’s post-Brown cases clarified that “the class of 
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testimonial statements . . . is broader than formal statements made to police during an interrogation 
to solve a crime.”379  
Accordingly, the court adjusted its analysis to mirror United States Supreme Court 
precedent in which courts conduct an objective analysis of the circumstances surrounding the 
statements.380  The court considered the fact that the statements “were made during a controlled 
drug buy set up for the express purpose of creating evidence for use at a future prosecution.”381 
The court also found significant that one of the statements on the recording was made to Lind, a 
law enforcement officer.382  Additionally, the primary purpose of the drug buy was to obtain 
evidence to convict Williams.383   For these reasons, “an objective witness in the informant's 
position would ‘reasonably believe’ her statements ‘would later be available for use in the 
prosecution of a crime,’” those statements were “inherently testimonial,” and therefore the 
statements were sufficient to qualify as testimonial.384  Because the informant’s statements were 
testimonial, the district court’s decision to admit the statements violated Williams’ Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation.385  Although the court agreed that admitting the informant’s 
statements violated Williams’ confrontation right, the court nevertheless affirmed Williams’ 
conviction because admitting the statements was harmless error.386 
VI. SENTENCING 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6620 (West 2017); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6627 (West 2017). 
Full Case Citation: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6620 (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6627 (West 2017). 




 K.S.A. §§ 21-6620 and K.S.A. § 21-6627 both explain the application of mandatory 
minimum sentences for certain crimes.387  In 2017, the Kansas Legislature amended both K.S.A. 
§§ 21-6620 and 21-6627, making minor changes to the wording in each.388  In addition to these 
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minor changes,  the legislature added two clarifying sentences to K.S.A. § 21-6620 subsections 
(a)(2)(B), (b)(2), (c)(1)(B) and (c)(2)(B).389  These sections address when the mandatory 
minimum of 25 years does not apply.390  Prior to the 2017 amendments, if the defendant “would 
be subject to presumptive imprisonment” under the sentencing grid and the sentencing range 
exceeded 300 months, the statute called for the defendant to be sentenced according to the 
mandatory minimum under the sentencing grid.391  After the amendment, when a defendant 
“would be subject to presumptive imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing guidelines grid for 
nondrug crimes and the sentencing range would exceed 300 months if the sentence established 
for a severity level 1 crime was imposed,” the defendant receive a mandatory minimum sentence 
“equal to the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime” under the sentencing grid.392  
Additionally, the amended sections state that no parole is available to the defendant until the 
defendant has served the mandatory minimum.393  Further, the amendments prohibit the 
application of good time credits to reduce the sentence.”394 
State v. Allen, 407 P.3d 661 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017)  
Full Case Citation: State v. Allen, 55 Kan. App. 2d 87, 407 P.3d 661 (2017). 
 
2016 CPS Section: VI.B.1.d.- Sentencing / Kansas Sentencing / Sentencing Determination / 
Consecutive & Concurrent Sentences 
 
Summary: 
 Marcus William Allen was on probation in two separate cases when he violated the terms 
of both probation periods.395  In both cases Allen stipulated that he had violated his probation.396  
In each case the judge ordered 60-day probation periods.397  At the second hearing, the judge 
ordered the two 60-day probation sanctions to run consecutively, for a total of 120 days 
probation.398  Allen objected, relying on K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3716(c)(10) which provides that 
“[i]f an offender is serving multiple probation terms concurrently, any violation sanctions 
imposed . . . pursuant to subsection (c)(11), shall be imposed concurrently.”399  The district court 
overruled his objection.400  
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The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the statute does prohibit 
ordering probations to run consecutively.401  Although the State argued that the statute’s 
probation violations should only apply to proceedings in a single district court, the Court of 
Appeals reasoned that “there are two triggers to the application of [the statute’s] rule.  First, the 
offender must be ‘serving multiple probation terms concurrently.’  Second, violation 
sanctions must be imposed under one of the listed subsections.  If those conditions are met, then 
any sanction ‘shall be imposed concurrently.’”402  Because Allen was serving multiple probation 
terms concurrently and the sanctions were imposed under one of the listed subsections, the 
district court was required to order Allen’s probation to run concurrently.403 
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